Combination of Halakhic Approaches Through “Safek Safeka”
Question:
With respect for the Rav,
It is well-known that those who teach practical halakhah usually combine different halachic approaches through a safek safeka.[1]
For example, I saw where someone holds that if there is a cooking pot and it is not known whether or not an entire 24-hour period has passed since it was last used, but it is known that it remained unused overnight, it is possible sometimes – bedieved – to treat it as though it is not ben yomo. For perhaps an entire day has passed from its last use (safek), and one could say that perhaps the halakhah is like Rashi and other Rishonim who hold that a cooking pot – as long as it remained unused overnight – even though an entire may not have passed since its last use, is not ben yomo (safeka).
Or with sefirat ha-omer in regard to a man who does not remember whether he counted the first day. There are those who permit him to count with a blessing because perhaps he did count (safek), and one could say that perhaps is according to the opinion in the Gemara that says the mitzvah of counting is for each day separately (safeka).
There are many cases like this where halakhic approaches are combined [2] in making a determination, with one of the doubts being “perhaps the halakhah is like so-and-so.”
So the question is:
1) It is not clear to me what the implication of “perhaps the halakhah is like so-and-so” is exactly. What is the nature of the doubt? Is there only one person whose opinion is the halakhah? After all, “elu ve-elu divrei Elohim chayyim” right? What exactly is the doubt?
2) Or consider the example that I brought. Neither the Shulchan Arukh nor the Rama bring the opinion of Rashi at all, namely that it is enough for a cooking pot to remain unused overnight for it to no longer be considered ben yomo. Why, then, is there a doubt that “perhaps the halakhah is like Rashi”? Is there a doubt – God forbid – that perhaps the ruling of Shulchan Arukh is not the halakhah?
Thank you in advance.
Answer:
1-2. This halakhic approach – adding one doubt to another – is not universally agreed upon just like the halakhah is not universally agreed upon. For our obligation is to clarify whose opinion is the halakhah. And if we do not succeed in reaching a decision, because the various opinions are equal and there are proofs for this view and proofs for that view, the guiding principle is that safek de-orayta le-chumra, that is to say, we are obligated to be strict because the disagreement involves a matter of Torah law. And in a doubt regarding Torah law one must be strict. And if the doubt involves a matter of Rabbinic law, the guiding principle is that one must be lenient.
However, in many cases those who use this halakhic approach do not see themselves as those who are able to make a decision between the halakhic opinions involved in such disagreements because they nullify themselves before those who came before them. Therefore, they add an additional doubt to their already existing doubt as to whose opinion is truly the halakhah, and so even when their doubt involves a matter of Torah law, after there are two doubts – according to this halakhic approach – they instruct people to be lenient.[3]
Notes:
[1] A safek safeka ("double doubt") is a case that contains two independent doubtful aspects. In such a case, the matter becomes permitted. However, since the times of the later authorities (the "Acharonim"), a safek safeka has come to be understood instead as a case that has two lenient opinions associated with it, making it possible - as it were - to rule leniently.
[2] The combination of halakhic approaches (called in Hebrew tzirufei shitot) is a method of determining halakhah from the times of the later authorities (the "Acharonim") wherein all opinions (usually those of the Rishonim) are given equal weight as being valid or true, even when they contradict. The lending of validity to contradictory opinions among the Rishonim is usually used to create halakhic doubt - very often leading to the type of safek safeka mentioned above - and can result in either a strict or a lenient opinion.
[3] To be lenient in a matter of Torah law violates the principle of safek de-orayta le-chumra.